Nor were Transatlantic relations that much better, according to the traditional account at least. 7 Part of the discord sprang from a record number of trade disputes between the EC and the Reagan Administration, the subject of Duccio Basosi's contribution to this volume. At a more fundamental level, however, the difficulties reflected a serious divergence between Washington and most European capitals in both economic policy and approach to the cold war. The economic priorities of Reagan's America thus differed markedly from most European governments (Thatcher's Britain would be a partial exception) and a similar gap had opened up in readings of the cold war. Whereas the American priority in the early 1980s seem to be to adopt a newly forceful, if not confrontational, stance towards the Soviet Union even at the expense of a serious increase in East-West tension, most Western
European states sought instead to maintain important elements of the European détente of the 1970s. 8 Reconciling such divergent goals would not prove to be an easy matter. And to make matters worse, Reagan's public image in Europe replete with suggestions that the former actor was an ignorant and dangerous 'cowboy', intent on taking the world to the edge of nuclear war, only increased the pressure on European governments, especially those of the centre-left, to distance themselves from Washington.
This chapter will not seek dramatically to overturn this picture of either European or Transatlantic affairs. Indeed the opening section will confirm the existence of a number of important divergences between the incoming US administration and its principal European allies. It will also confirm Reagan's European image problem. Based on the first crop of archival releases relating to the early 1980s, primarily from the Reagan Presidential Library in California the chapter will, however, seek to add a level of nuance and complexity to this account. It will thus suggest that despite the periodic Transatlantic disputes that punctuate the period, some of the underlying mechanics of the partnership between the United States and their principal Western European allies continued to work surprisingly smoothly, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Unlike some early periods of Transatlantic discord, in other words, disputes over substance did not feed through into rows about how Transatlantic dialogue should be conducted. Second it will argue that the very complexity of interchange and interaction between the two sides of the Atlantic, involving as it did a huge array of different institutional links, makes it vital for any historian seeking to arrive at a balanced judgement of Transatlantic ties to look beyond the headline grabbing personal relationships between Reagan and his European counterparts. And third it will suggest that the structures of Transatlantic cooperation during this period were actually extraordinarily favourable to European influence in Washington during this period. The periodic complaints of European leaders who believed that Reagan's America paid little heed to their interests and was indeed growing away from the 'old world' do therefore need to be taken with more than a pinch of salt.
West-West Tension over East-West Conflict
At the heart of political tensions that characterised Transatlantic relations during the early Reagan years was a basic divergence in cold war tactics. This in turn was aggravated by a mismatch in the general political cycles of several of the key Western powers, with the United States and Britain moving to the right well before West
Germany did the same, and France moving in the opposite direction entirely. In such circumstances, European leaders found it very hard to look favourably upon US urgings that their countries adopt hard line cold war stances, especially when to do so would be both financially and politically expensive. This was true of the debate about NATO rearmament where US pressure for a generalised arms build up was a source of discomfort for those such as Schmidt who were conscious of the high political price that was already being paid within the ruling SPD party in particular in order to get the dual track decision through, and acutely aware of the budgetary constraints faced by even a comparatively well performing European economy like that of West Germany. The pained (if discreet) reaction of the German government to the US announcement that it intended to resume production of neutron bomb warheads underlined the ongoing political sensitivity of the whole rearmament debate this issue we will be very careful in our public and private comments not to characterize EC participation as anything over than support for the treaty of peace.
We certainly will not characterize it as an EC underwriting of the whole Camp David process. Let us agree to disagree about the essential if there is to be a peace process in any form.' But the key was that the EC reached a position which would enable
European member states to participate in the MFO.
42
The first wave of archival releases does therefore suggest a greater role for the EPC in Transatlantic dialogue during this era than might perhaps have been expected. different layers of diplomacy and interdependence, to take account of how rows in one forum might or might not spill over into other seeming unrelated discussions in a different institutional setting, and to trace action and inaction from one type of international organisation to another. They also need to develop both a strong stomach for seemingly arcane rows about why one institutional forum might be preferable for a given action than another -witness for example the lengthy debate between Haig and Genscher in 1982 about whether the Americans' campaign to limit the export credits Western governments accorded to companies wishing to sell to the Soviet Union should be something dealt with inside or outside of the OECD 54 -and good antennae as to how a seemingly innocuous decision to change the institutional setting might in fact be a serious change of policy.
Traditional big personality history connected to the ups and downs of relationships between Reagan, Thatcher, Schmidt, Kohl, Mitterrand or Giuliano
Andreotti will continue to have both its relevance and its obvious appeal. Indeed in an era when summitry, both bilateral and multilateral had become more realistic and more frequent thanks to easy air travel and a greater readiness by many of the key leaders to speak to one another by telephone, such personal relationships arguably 
Conclusions
Able to look back at the period as a whole, the historian does thus need to avoid being wholly taken in by the torrent of European lamentation about global marginalisation.
Western Europe did not always get its way with Reagan's America. Indeed, as the first part of this chapter recalled, the 1980s were to see multiple policy disputes between the two sides of the Atlantic over global economic governance as much as about the conduct of the East-West conflict. It is also the case that the period did see Western Europe's competitive position eroded in vital economic sectors, vis-à-vis both the US and Japan. Over time this would lessen Western Europe's global centrality and its ability to influence US policy, although it was a trend that would be powerfully counteracted in the latter half of the 1980s by the revitalisation of the 59 Although the relaunch awaits an archivally based treatment, it is already the subject of a copious America and his European counterparts, the 1980s were in a sense the apogee of Atlantic cooperation. It was therefore perhaps appropriate that they were a decade that would culminate in a major geo-political transformation, the ending of the cold war, which was profoundly European and Atlantic in character.
